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We present  evidence  from  Rwanda’s  Girinka  (‘One  Cow  per  Poor  Family’)  program  that  has
distributed  more  than  130,000  livestock  asset  transfers  in  the  form  of  cows  to  the  rural  poor
since 2006.  Supply  side  constraints  on the program  resulted  in some  beneﬁciaries  receiving
complementary  training  with  the  cow  transfer,  and  other  households  not  receiving  such
training  with  their  cow.  We  exploit  these  differences  to  estimate  the  additional  impact  of
receiving  complementary  training  with  the  cow  transfer,  on  household’s  economic  out-
comes up  to six  years  after  having  received  the  livestock  asset  transfer.  Our results  show
that even  in  a setting  such  as rural  Rwanda  where  linkages  between  farmers  and  produce
markets  are  weak,  the  provision  of training  with  asset  transfers  has  permanent  and  eco-
nomically  signiﬁcant  impacts  on milk  production,  milk  yields  from  livestock,  household
earnings,  and asset  accumulation.  The  results  have  important  implications  for the  design
of ‘ultra-poor’  livestock  asset transfer  programs  being  trialled  globally  as  a means  to  allow
the rural  poor  to better their  economic  lives.
©  2014  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
. Introduction
The world’s poor lack capital and skills (Banerjee and Duﬂo, 2007). Many antipoverty programs aim to either relax
redit constraints for poor households, or to relax constraints related to their ability to acquire human capital. For example,
he spread of rural banking, provision of microﬁnance and asset transfer programs all represent efforts to ease capital
onstraints. Vocational training or cash transfers conditioned on school attendance spearhead policies attempting to tackle
kill constraints. The most recent wave of policy approaches have attempted to tackle both constraints simultaneously, as
mbodied in various ‘ultra-poor’ poverty programs. These provide assets to households in the form of livestock, combined
ith intense training on how to utilize those assets for production.
The results from randomized control trial (RCT) evaluations of these interventions are promising: Bandiera et al. (2013)
ocument how one such program operated by BRAC in rural Bangladesh led, after four years, to the majority of beneﬁciaries
o retain the livestock asset, a 36% increase in beneﬁciary earnings, and an 8% increase in consumption per adult equivalent.
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Banerjee et al. (2011) evaluate a comparable bundled program of livestock asset transfers and training in West Bengal and
ﬁnd consumption increases of 15% relative to baseline. Finally, Murdoch et al. (2012) evaluate a similar program in Utter
Pradesh, India, but ﬁnd more muted impacts, perhaps because of the co-existence of a generous wage employment program
operating in Utter Pradesh at the same time.
These types of livestock asset transfer and training programs are now being piloted in ten countries around the world, and
policy makers are paying great attention to whether such interventions improve the economic lives of the world’s poorest.
As such, combined programs of livestock asset transfers and intense training are viewed as a promising way  to transform
the economic lives of typically landless, assetless agricultural laborers, into the economic lives more closely resembling
households engaged in basic entrepreneurial activities focused around livestock rearing and the regular sales of livestock
produce.1
Common to all these interventions is the simultaneous bundling of asset transfers and training. However, each component
is very costly to provide. Livestock asset transfers are necessarily expensive because animals are indivisible: even supplying
one cow or buffalo to a household can increase its baseline wealth ten-fold, especially if the very poorest households, that
are typically landless and assetless at baseline, are targeted (Bandiera et al., 2013). Training is expensive because as targeted
households tend never to have previously owned livestock, they lack the human capital to utilize livestock. Training then
is necessarily intense because beneﬁciary households need to be taught how to look after animals across the harvesting
cycle, and the birth-milk production cycle of large livestock can last up to 18 months. Given these costs, it is important to
establish the returns to both training and asset transfer components. Moreover, as such programs are being rapidly rolled
out around the world, as they scale-up they will begin to target slightly different populations, and will also begin to operate
in economic environments that vary in the ability of local markets to provide training. It then becomes a more open question
as to whether the provision of both components of asset transfers and training are equally cost effective.
The evidence we provide represents a novel ﬁrst step in this direction. More speciﬁcally, we document new evidence
on the additional impact of receiving training with livestock asset transfers, by evaluating Rwanda’s Girinka (’One Cow per
Poor Family’) program that distributed a cow to each identiﬁed beneﬁciary household. Beneﬁciaries were identiﬁed by their
communities to be among the poorest in the locality. Central to our research design is that the program has been jointly
implemented by government agencies as well as a number of NGOs. On the government side, the main implementing agency
was the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRI), while the largest of the NGOs involved were Heifer International and Send a Cow.
As detailed in the next section, supply side constraints on government and NGO capabilities resulted in some beneﬁciaries
receiving training with the cow transfer, and other households not receiving such training, but only the cow transfer.
We exploit these supply side constraints to estimate the impact of receiving training with the livestock transfer on
household’s medium term likelihood to produce milk, to trade milk, and the impacts on household’s earnings and asset
accumulation. While ours is not a randomized control trial, we are able to offer among the ﬁrst tentative evidence on
the marginal impact of complementary training in addition to livestock asset transfers. This is key for the future design
and expansion of such ultra-poor style asset transfer programs. Moreover, in contrast to current evaluations of ultra-poor
programs, we  document these impacts over the longer term, up to six years after the receipt of the Girinka cow for some
households. Relative to some of the ultra-poor evaluations described above (Banerjee et al., 2011; Murdoch et al., 2012;
Bandiera et al., 2013) we also provide more detailed evidence on the mechanisms through which such programs likely
generate earnings gains to households, such as the propensity to produce milk, and milk yields per animal.2
To evaluate the Girinka program and measure the impacts of farmers having received training with the asset transfers
relative to those that only received the asset, in 2012 we surveyed 885 beneﬁciaries of the Girinka program in 2012. They had
received their cows since 2006, with the median household having received the cow in 2009. We  are thus able to assess the
longer term impacts of the original provision of training bundled with the livestock asset, and again this time span is longer
than that covered by the current generation of RCT evaluations of ultra-poor style livestock transfer programs. In addition to
the main data collected from this sample of Girinka beneﬁciaries, we also conducted a survey of government sector vets that
served our sample population and we conducted unstructured interviews with a number of stakeholders - most importantly
with Girinka NGO partners who were responsible for the distribution of some of the cows. This provides further insights into
the actual operations of the Girinka program and especially the existence and nature of supply constraints that we exploit
to measure the impact of training over and above livestock transfers.
1 To get a sense of the scale and prominence of these types of asset transfer program, we  note that as of 2011, BRAC’s program in Bangladesh was already
reaching close to 400,000 women  and a further 250,000 will be reached between 2012 and 2016. Another variant of the program in which the asset transfer
is  purchased using a loan had reached 600,000 beneﬁciaries in 2011 and will reach a further 150,000 by 2016 (BRAC, 2011). As of November 2011, ten
different pilots were active around the world, http://graduation.cgap.org/pilots/ (last accessed 10th of July 2014). BRAC is piloting the program in both
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Other pilots are being carried out in by other organizations in Andhra Pradesh, Ethiopia, Ghana, Haiti, Honduras, Pakistan, Peru
and  Yemen.
2 As our analysis is based on a sample of Girinka beneﬁciaries, our estimates measure the impact of training provision in addition to an asset transfer. We
do  not measure the impact of the asset transfer relative to not receiving anything. Hence our results have no implications for whether households should
be  taking up such programs in the ﬁrst place. Such an analysis is conducted by Rawlins et al. (2014) for the cows distributed by Heifer International as part
of  the Girinka program, comparing recipients to either future beneﬁciaries or non-beneﬁciaries. Among a sample of around 4000 households, they ﬁnd
substantial impacts of cow transfers on dairy and meat consumption, as well as improvements in child anthropometrics.
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Our main results are as follows. First, households that received training with their cow are 56% more likely to be producing
ilk in 2012, and on average produce 1.5 l more milk per day. This corresponds to a 162% increase in milk production over
ouseholds that received no training. This increased production stems largely from increased milk yields obtained holding
onstant the stock of cows, rather than increased holdings of cows per se.  Second, the increased production and sales of milk
ranslate into signiﬁcantly higher households earnings: households with training experience a sixfold increase in earnings
rom milk sales as compared to the average earnings of households that did not receive training. Moreover, the other key
ncome gain for trained households comes through sales of animals. These income gains dwarf the monetary cost of the
raining supplied per farmer, generating rates of return far in excess of those that are likely to be available through other
nvestments. Finally, the increased earnings households with training experience, translate into greater asset accumulation:
ouseholds that received training with their transferred cow since 2006, are signiﬁcantly more likely to own  cooking stoves,
icycles and mattresses by the date of the survey in 2012.
Overall, the results show that even in a setting where linkages between farmers and markets remain weak so that the
eturns to training might be somewhat attenuated (say because farmers cannot capture any value added from being able
o sell to urban consumers), the provision of training with asset transfers still has permanent and economically signiﬁcant
mpacts on household’s ability to produce milk, livestock productivity, earnings, and asset accumulation. In short, farmer
kills related to animal husbandry matter and prior to the program there are likely to have been binding constraints on the
uman capital farmers had on this dimension. Attempts to improve these types of human capital are likely to yield high
ean returns, as well as reducing income volatility as households are more able to rely on stable income streams from the
ales of livestock produce such as milk. These type of human capital investments, for those that have long exited the formal
chooling system, are an important form of antipoverty measure.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the One Cow program. Section 3 describes our data and empirical
ethod. Section 4 presents the core ﬁndings, and Section 5 concludes.
. The Girinka ‘One Cow’ program
In 2011 Rwanda had a GDP per capita of just under $600, placing it in the bottom decile of the world cross-country
ncome distribution. However, over the last decade Rwanda has witnessed strong income growth driven primarily by the
ervices and agriculture sectors, with real GDP per capita increasing at over 5% per annum, and poverty falling by 12pp in the
ast ﬁve years alone (National Institute of Statistics Rwanda, 2012). However, despite this recent success, exports remain
oncentrated in traditional strengths of tea, coffee and minerals; at least 70% of the population still rely on agriculture for
heir livelihoods, more than 40% of the population live below the national poverty line that is at slightly less than $190 per
nnum, or 52c per day.
The Girinka (“One Cow Per Poor Family”) program was  initiated by President Paul Kagame in 2006 as part of the ﬁght
gainst rural poverty. The aim was to use livestock asset transfers to increase productivity in the livestock and agriculture
ectors, and hence drive improvements in household incomes and poverty reduction among the rural poor. As of today, over
30,000 of the poorest rural families have received a Girinka cow. The program has been jointly implemented by government
gencies as well as NGOs. On the government side, the main agencies involved include the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRI),
budehe (a government organization that takes a participatory approach to poverty reduction), FARG (a Genocide Survivors
rganization) as well as various agriculture projects such as PADEBL (Dairy Cattle Development Support Project) and KWAMP
Kirehe Community- based Watershed Management Project). The largest NGOs involved were Heifer International and Send
 Cow, but there were many other smaller NGO distributors involved as well. The program aimed to genetically strengthen
he population of cows by introducing higher productivity cow varieties to Rwanda. The ‘exotic’ cow breeds distributed
ave included Friesian/Holstein and Jersey varieties, as these breeds produce far more milk than the indigenous species.
rossbreeds between these varieties and the local breed were expected to perform particularly well, given their higher
esistance to heat and local parasites.3
We  now describe how the program operated, focusing on the elements key to our research design. Focusing ﬁrst on what
GOs do, we emphasize that the primary role of NGOs lies in the distribution of cows. However, some Girinka providers
nclude training as part of their program when they give a beneﬁciary a cow, while others do not. Those providers that provide
raining typically train all beneﬁciaries to whom they give a cow. Interviews with NGOs in the sector revealed that some
iewed training as an integral part of the package. For example Send a Cow, one of the largest NGO partners in the program,
xplained their Girinka operation as being a ﬁve year process, beginning with training in preparation for receiving the cow
e.g. producing feed, building a shed) and ending with the households graduating out of poverty because they had acquired
he skills to care and manage cows as a productive asset. To get a sense of the intensity of training provided, we  obtained
nformation on training costs from one of the most important NGO partners for the delivery of the Girinka program, Send a
3 All cows were supposed to be distributed in-calf, so that the household would have a new calf and milk production within a short space of time. However,
stimates from our data suggest that in reality, less than one third were actually distributed in-calf. In order for the program to be self-perpetuating,
eneﬁciaries were obliged to “pass on the gift” by giving the ﬁrst born calf to a new beneﬁciary household in the area (the so called “pass-on” or kwitura
n  Kinyarwanda). Where the ﬁrstborn calf is a bull, it is expected to be sold to purchase a heifer to pass on. As the price for heifers is typically higher, the
urchased heifer would usually be younger than the bull sold and not yet old enough to breed.
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Fig. 1. (A) The share of households in a cell that receive training with their Girinka cow. (B) Scatterplot of the share of households that receive training
with  their Girinka cow against the total number of Girinka cows distributed in the cell. (C) Scatterplot of the share of households that receive training with
their  Girinka cow against the average monthly household expenditure in the cell. Notes: The total number of recipient households in each cell is calculated
from  the sampling frame as described in the methodology section. A ﬁtted regression line is shown in Fig. 1B and C: neither slope coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly
different from zero at conventional levels. All ﬁgures are at the cell level, and all are unweighted.
Cow. Their training related to animal husbandry, that takes place over seven days and to groups of farmers, was estimated
to cost around RWF  7,800 per beneﬁciary. It is this cost ﬁgure that we  will later be able to compare any monetary returns
generated by the training to.
Our structured interviews with providers shed some light on what leads some NGOs to provide training and others not:
whether the NGO provides training with the cow is largely dependent on both their philosophy (what they perceive to be
local knowledge of cows and the necessity of training), and simple differences in NGO resources. On differences in NGO
philosophy, some NGOs reported choosing not to provide additional support with cow transfers for one of two  reasons. First,
some argued that as animal husbandry has been deeply rooted in the Rwandan culture, a body of local knowledge existed
among farmers that can be passed on through social learning. While this might well be the case for traditional breeds, it
would not apply to the same extent to some of the exotic cow breeds distributed through the Girinka program. In addition,
an established body of evidence suggests such processes of learning can be slow, inefﬁcient and limited by other social norms
(Foster and Rosenzweig, 2010). Second, some NGO providers perceived government veterinarians to be easily accessible to
farmers in case of need, and so training to already be effectively on hand to beneﬁciary households. However, as the data
described below shows, travel times to the nearest government vets are typically quite high, so households face high ﬁxed
costs, or waiting costs, in order to be able to access such services. Moreover, these vets are often overburdened by having to
serve a large number of farmers over a geographically dispersed area.
Our empirical analysis exploits the fact that different distributors of cows offered varying levels of training, support and
extension services to recipients of cows. Some distributors provided cows with no complementary training at all. Other
distributors hired their own veterinarians/trainers to extend services to their new beneﬁciaries. Some distributors also gave
some form of support package along with the cow, including for example medicines, or the materials for building a shed to
house the animal.The second important element to understand for the research design is where NGOs operate. We note ﬁrst that there
are multiple NGO providers in each cell (or group of villages). Girinka providers are able to choose the cells where they
work. As NGOs vary in whether they provide training, there is considerable within-cell variation in training provision. Fig. 1A
shows the CDF for the percentage of trained households across cells in our sample. This variation is driven by the mix  of
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roviders operating in each cell: to reiterate, providers that do provide training typically train all beneﬁciaries to whom
hey give a cow. In the average cell, 37% of households are treated (i.e. provided training with their Girinka cow). In 25%
f cells, at most 25% of households are treated, and in 25% of cells at least 20% of households are treated. No cell has more
han 87% of households treated and only two cells have 0% treated. To examine if there are cell characteristics that drive
he percentage of households that are treated in the cell, Fig. 1B and C shows scatterplots (across cells) of the percentage
f treated households against: (i) the total number of Girinka cows given in the cell; (ii) the average monthly household
xpenditure in the cell. Neither ﬁgure suggests a very strong correlation between these cell characteristics and the share of
reated households: a line of best ﬁt is shown in each, and neither slope coefﬁcient is signiﬁcance at conventional levels.
The third key element of how the program operated is in terms of the selection of beneﬁciary households. Beneﬁciaries
re chosen entirely by the local community. The involvement of the community in determining beneﬁciaries is akin to partic-
patory wealth rankings that are becoming a common method by which to identify the rural poor. In a randomized evaluation
f different targeting methods, Alatas et al. (2012) show that, compared to proxy means tests, community appraisal methods
esulted in higher satisfaction and greater legitimacy. Communities are also required to take account of speciﬁc eligibility
riteria for the Girinka program. The program targets the poorest households subject to them having sufﬁcient resources
o care for any transferred animal. Formal eligibility criteria were in place from 2009 onwards and these selection criteria
ere that the household did not already own a cow; had ownership of at least 0.3 ha of land but not more than 0.75 ha of
and; had planted sufﬁcient feed area (approximately 0.2 ha) and had the ability to build a shed for the cow. Interviews with
istrict and sector vets conducted as part of this study revealed that communities typically were able to select beneﬁciaries
ubject to them meeting these criteria.4
To be clear, NGOs are neither involved in conducting the wealth ranking nor in drawing up these beneﬁciary lists. Once
ligible households are identiﬁed, the community then proceeds to order households on the list from poorest to richest
placing households into Ubudehe categories). Communities typically meet collectively to decide this ordering. Providers
hat enter a cell then have to follow these beneﬁciary lists when distributing cows. As such, the within-cell assignment
f households into treatment (trained) and control (not trained) groups are independent of the speciﬁc provider. We then
xploit the quasi-random assignment into treatment and control groups within-cells to identify the impact of training
eceived with the cow transfer, on the medium and longer term outcomes of households.
. Data, descriptives and empirical method
.1. Sampling
We  use two data sources: primary data collected from a sample of Girinka beneﬁciaries, and a survey of government
ector vets. The ideal sampling strategy for beneﬁciaries would have been to draw a (stratiﬁed) random sample of all
istributed cows. However, no central database of all cows distributed by all partner organizations exists. Instead, hard copy
ists of all cows distributed in each region are maintained by local government ofﬁces. These hard copy lists of distributed
ows were provided to us by the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources (MINAGRI) through the cooperation of local
fﬁcials. However, while comprehensive with respect to cows originally distributed, these lists are not always updated when
eneﬁciaries move or the transferred cow dies for example.5
Girinka beneﬁciaries for our survey were therefore selected using a multistage cluster sample design. In the ﬁrst stage
f drawing our sample, 10 out of Rwanda’s 30 district were selected according to their population size within provincial
trata (one in Kigali, three in the South, two in each of the North, East and West). Within each district, two to four sectors
ere drawn according to their population size, so as to have a total of 30 sectors in the sample. In these 30 sectors completeists of beneﬁciary households were obtained. Within each sector, cells (groups of villages) were chosen using probabilities
roportional to population size to select two cells from each sector, for a total of 60 cells. From each cell we selected 16
eneﬁciary households by simple random sample (as well as four replacements for cases where beneﬁciaries could not be
ocated). General operational challenges necessitated dropping one cell in the North from the sample, leaving our expected
4 Two other points are of note. First, our ﬁeld interviews with district and sector vets suggested that it is typically the poorest who receive cows ﬁrst,
nd  that while the eligibility criteria have not always been strictly followed, they typically erred on the side of providing cows to the very poorest. Second,
rior  to 2009 there were concerns raised that the poorest were not being well targeted by the Girinka program. There followed an investigation into the
rogram, ordered by President Paul Kagame. As a result, the government undertook a large scale operation where more than 20,000 cows were conﬁscated
nd  redistributed, although it was later determined that some who had had their cows conﬁscated were actually poor too (despite being local leaders) and
o  their names were added to the lists to receive cows again in the future.
5 Rwanda is divided into administrative regions as follows: 5 provinces, 30 districts, 416 sectors, 2184 cells, and 14,837 villages. Hence a cell refers to a
mall  group of villages. There are generally very low levels of migration in Rwanda. According to the latest census report from 2012, only 10% of Rwandans
ive  outside of the province of their birth (lifetime migration), and this includes a signiﬁcant amount of urbanization. In our ﬁeldwork we encountered very
ew  cases where we were unable to ﬁnd the beneﬁciary household from the list. Hence our sample is likely to be quite representative of the households
hat  received cows up to six years ago. If the original Girinka cow was dead, the household was replaced with another from the replacement list. There
ere seven cases where such a replacement was required.
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sample at 944 households. The achieved sample size was  885 beneﬁciary households, the shortfall being due to enumerators
being unable to locate households, not due to non-response. In the empirical analysis, survey weights are used throughout.6
For interviews with government sector veterinarians, the sampling procedure was straightforward: each cell in Rwanda
hosts one ofﬁcial veterinarian so that we were able to approach and interview all 30 government veterinarians that cover
the 30 cells in our study sample.
3.2. Survey instruments
Girinka beneﬁciaries were administered a household questionnaire including standard modules on household demo-
graphics, income, expenditure, and an asset module related to current asset ownership and ownership at the time of receiving
the Girinka cow. The questionnaire also included modules on milk production, milk sales (quantities and prices), milk trans-
fers/gifts and own consumption of milk.7 Around six months after the household survey was ﬁelded, we surveyed sector
vets by telephone. The survey was conducted with all vets present in areas where beneﬁciaries interviewed reside, imply-
ing 30 interviews (one per sector). The main purpose was to collect additional information on questions that arose during
the analysis of information provided by beneﬁciaries. We  conducted additional unstructured interviews with a number of
stakeholders – most importantly with Girinka NGO partners who  were responsible for the distribution of cows, and some
of which provided training bundled with the cow.
3.3. Descriptives
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the sampled Girinka cow beneﬁciary households, where standard errors are
clustered at the cell level and survey weights are used throughout. The ﬁrst panel gives information on the head of household
that received a Girinka cow. They have at most primary (58%) or no (34%) education, derive their main income sources from
farming (91%), and have household sizes of around 5.4. Prior to the Girinka cow transfer, beneﬁciary households are almost
assetless: they own on average three assets, which would typically be a hand-hoe (owned by 94% of the households), a radio
(owned by 61%) and a mattress (49%). These characteristics of beneﬁciaries (having low levels of human capital, being reliant
on agriculture for income and owning very few assets), very much make them resemble the world’s poor (Banerjee and Duﬂo,
2007) and those that have been targeting by other livestock asset transfer programs (Banerjee et al., 2011; Murdoch et al.,
2012; Bandiera et al., 2013).
The next batch of variables all highlight the geographic remoteness of households, and their access to government
veterinarians, that might be a potential substitute for any training provided with the Girinka cow. The average travel time
for the sector vet to reach the cell in which the household resides is 48 minutes, and sector vets report visiting on average
at least one household in the cell around once every seven days: the maximum time recorded between visits is 14 days. In
short, households have limited access to sector vets, and so there are few close substitutes available for any training provided
initially with the cow transfer. The data also highlights how geographically remote these households are, and consequently,
they have limited access to markets. As such, the potential income gains from raising cow productivity – that might arise
because of training provision – might also be limited in this context, and this can attenuate the returns to training.
The remaining rows of Table 1 describe features of the livestock transfers: the average beneﬁciary received the Girinka
cow in 2009; 23% of these cows are pass-ons, meaning that they were not received from an NGO or the government but from
someone within the community who had received a Girinka cow previously. Some NGOs track activities within the villages
they operate in over time, and so such pass-ons might also be received with the same kinds of complementary training
being provided by the NGO as for the original Girinka cow. Most households received a cow of the Ankole breed, a breed
native to Africa. About 21% of households received either an exotic purebred, or a cow that is sufﬁciently highly crossbred
to display most of the genetic markers of the exotic breed: these cows are typically associated with higher milk production
and hence higher returns. Nevertheless, they are at the same time perceived to be of higher risk as they are less apt to cope
with unpredictable ﬂuctuations in the environment or disease outbreaks and require more careful feeding to realize their
potential.
6 The cell in the North was  dropped due to delays in getting survey teams to the ﬁeld. This was down to logistical delays, and was unrelated to the
geography or location of the cell dropped. There were a few other minor adjustments to the sample. One cell in Buruhukiro sector (Nyamagabe district,
Southern Province) was  too small for the desired sample, so it was  combined with the next smallest cell in the sector. Kagarama sector in Kicukiro was
replaced by Gahanga sector, as Kagarama was  too wealthy and there were not enough recipients to sample from. To deal with imperfections in the sampling
frame in ﬁeld, the following rules were followed: (i) all 16 selected beneﬁciaries should be exhausted before using replacements; (ii) where a cow had
been  taken away pre-2009 and redistributed within the same cell, the enumerator followed the cow to the new recipient; (iii) if an original beneﬁciary had
moved  within the same cell (e.g. between villages), they were tracked to their new village; (iv) where the cow or individual could not be traced (usually
because they had moved to a different cell), a replacement was to be used; (v) where replacements were exhausted, the sector vet was  asked to provide a
replacement in the form of the household closest to the one originally sampled.
7 The questionnaire included an informed consent page, which explained to beneﬁciaries that their participation was  voluntary and reassured them that
they  would not be personally identiﬁable. Enumerators requested that beneﬁciaries provide verbal conﬁrmation that they understood what is required for
informed consent and agreed to participate. Verbal consent was  preferred since many beneﬁciaries are not literate and are not comfortable signing a piece
of  paper that they do not understand. A copy of the questionnaire and consent form are available on request.
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Table  1
Descriptive statistics of Girinka cow beneﬁciaries.
(1) (2)
Mean (std. dev) Diff. betw. beneﬁciary HHs
with and without training,
Sector FE [p-value]
Household (HH) head Age Age of the HH head 47.027 0.277
(13.261) [0.962]
Gender =1 if the HH head is female 0.321 −0.064
(0.467) [0.089]
No education =1 if the HH head has no
education
0.331 −0.050
(0.471) [0.212]
Primary education =1 if the HH head has some
primary education
0.579 0.056
(0.494) [0.187]
Occupation =1 if the HH head is farmer 0.912 0.045
(0.283) [0.129]
Household composition HH Members No of HH members 5.424 0.583
(2.175) [0.001]
Asset  holding No of assets owned No of assets HH owned before
receiving the Girinka cow
2.155 −0.011
(1.731) [0.924]
Information from Sector Vet Travel – minutes No of minutes for sector
veterinarian to reach the HHs
cell
48.849 0.492
(48.853) [0.103]
Travel – walking =1 if the sector vet walks to the
HHs cell
0.234 −0.009
(0.424) [0.026]
Travel – last visit Nr of days since the sector vet
visited the HHs cell (from mid
August 2012)
6.833 0.392
(12.469) [0.266]
Information on Girinka cow Year cow received Year in which the HH received
the Girinka cow
2009 −0.344
(1.582) [0.006]
Cow is a pass-on =1 if the Girinka cow was a
pass-on
0.226 −0.018
(0.419) [0.434]
Breed – traditional =1 if Girinka cow breed
reported Ankole
0.454 −0.141
(0.498) [0.007]
Breed – exotic =1 if Girinka cow breed
reported exotic
0.415 0.141
(0.493) [0.009]
Received with Girinka cow Training =1 if the HH received training
with the cow
0.298 n.a.
(0.458)
Medicines or other =1 if medicines or other (feed,
shed, loan) given with cow
0.14 0.117
(0.347) [0.008]
Notes: The Table shows summary statistics for selected characteristics for all households in our sample. The panel relate to characteristics of the household
head, household composition, asset holdings prior to Girinka cows being distributed, information obtained from sector vets, information related to the
Girinka cow and on training received. Column 1 shows the mean of each characteristic in the main working sample based on 786 household observations.
Column 2 shows the difference between those that did and did not receive training with the Girinka cows, with the p-value below in square brackets,
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ihere these allow for weighting the observations and clustered standard errors by cell. All variables indicated as “=” are “0” otherwise. “Exotic cow breeds”
nclude Fresian, Holstein, and Jersey.x.
The ﬁnal panel of Table 1 shows the percentage of households that report in the household survey to have received some
raining with the cow transfer: 30% of all Girinka beneﬁciaries received some type of training together with the cow, provided
y the distributing organization. Training provided could either be a session concentrating on a certain topic, or combine a
umber of topics in one training. If a beneﬁciary received training with the cow, then he or she reports to have been trained
n average on two topics. This is in line with information provided by sector vets who  report that private NGO providers
ypically spread their training over two sessions. The most common topic beneﬁciaries report to have been trained on when
eceiving the cow is how to build a shed (reported by 80% of trained beneﬁciaries). The second most common training topic
s feed (53%). Approximately a third of trained beneﬁciaries report to have received training on disease together with their
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cow. The same percentage of households received training on manure together with the cow. The ﬁnal row reports the
percentage of households that also received a pack of medicines or other inputs were provided with the cow: these take the
form of feed, sheds, material for building shed’s or micro loans. Around 14% of households report receiving such assistance
at the time of the Girinka cow transfer.
Column 2 in Table 1 shows the average difference on each characteristic between beneﬁciary households with and
without training, conditional on sector ﬁxed effects. The corresponding p-values are reported below this difference, and
these are obtained from a regression after weighting and clustering standard errors by cell, as in our empirical speciﬁcation
below. There are a number of signiﬁcant differences between households that did and did not receive any training with their
Girinka cow. However the likely biases these differences might induce are not all in the same direction. A priori, on some
factors, those with training are likely to be worse off all else equal: they are from larger households, and reside in locations
more remote from sector vets. On other factors they might be better off: they are less likely to be female headed and less
likely to have received a traditional Ankole cow. On a range of other observables, such as household head’s age, education
levels, pre-transfer asset holdings, frequency of visits to the sector from government veterinarians, there are no signiﬁcant
differences between households with and without training. Taken together, this evidence highlights that it will be important
to assess the robustness of the results to the inclusion of additional classes of controls.
Finally, we note that households that received training with their cow are also signiﬁcantly more likely to have received
a package of other inputs in the form of medicine, feed, a shed, or a loan. In our empirical analysis we will therefore be able
to assess whether and how the longer term returns to the provision of training, that aim to ease skills constraints among
beneﬁciaries, differ from the returns to these inputs, that essentially ease capital/input constraints at the time of the asset
transfer.
3.4. Empirical method
To evaluate the additional impact of training with the receipt of a Girinka cow transfer, we  estimate the following
speciﬁcation,
yics =  ˛ + ˇTi + 1Ci + 2Xheadi + 3Xhhi + 4Vetc + ıFEs + ics, (1)
where yics is the outcome of interest of household i in cell (village grouping) c and sector s; Ti equals one if household i
received training from the distributing NGO or government organization; Ci are variables at the Girinka cow level: type
of breed received, year the cow was received, indicator whether anything other than training was received with the cow
(medicines, feed, etc.), and an indicator whether it was  a pass-on; Xheadi includes information on the household head: age,
gender, education level, main economic activity; Xhhi features household characteristics: number of household members,
information on household composition, type of dwelling, type of roof and ﬂoor; Vetc includes cell level information provided
by the sector vet: the number of minutes it takes him/her (the vet) to reach the cell, an indicator whether (s)he travels to
the cell on foot, an interaction of these two variables, and the number of days passed since (s)he visited the cell; and FEs are
a set of dummies for each sector s to account for any unobserved heterogeneity across sectors that might determine some
outcomes, such as distance to local agricultural and livestock markets.
After dropping observations with any missing values from these sets of controls, our working sample corresponds to 786
beneﬁciary households. Given that equal probability sampling could not be applied at every stage of the sampling process,
we weight the data to be representative of the population. To account for common shocks/unobservables across households
in the same location, we cluster standard errors at the cell level.8
In this speciﬁcation,  ˇ is our coefﬁcient of interest: it measures the strength and direction of the relationship between
the outcome of interest and the training indicator. If the provision of this training is exogenous to unobservable farmer
characteristics, ics, ˆˇ would consistently identify the causal additional impact of training on household outcomes among
those that receive a Girinka cow. Of course, there are concerns that the provision of training is endogenously determined.
For example, if beneﬁciaries themselves select to receive training or not, then we expect those that stand the most to gain
8 To estimate population parameters, the data are weighted to be representative. Provincial level weights (to account for unequal provincial strata in
district  sampling) were calculated as the inverse of probability of being selected (number of districts in province/number chosen in province). District level
weights  were calculated as the inverse of probability of selection within the district (number of sectors in district/number chosen in district) multiplied
by  the total recipient population in each district. Sector level weights were calculated as the inverse of probability of selection within the sector (number
of  cells in sector/2) multiplied by the total recipient population in each sector. The sector weight was normalized such that the total of sector weights
within each district is equal across districts. Cell level clusters were selected with replacement by probability proportional to size – thus the weight for each
cell  selected is the number of times this cell was  selected (before the algorithm terminated) divided by the total number of cells (including cells selected
multiple times) selected. The design weights are calculated as the product of the provincial, district, sector and cell weights, normalized to the size of the
population under study (for the expected sample). As response rates varied across the sampled districts, non-response weights were also calculated. The
non-response adjustment was to increase the size of the weight on each cell by the inverse of the response rate. This assumes that those missing in a
particular cell are represented in an unbiased way  by those who were achieved. Given that there were almost zero refusals (there was only one recorded
refusal by a household that did have a cow), this is not problematic in terms of self-selection into the survey. However, because those that moved recently
from  one cell to another may  well differ from non-movers (given Rwanda’s tightly organized communities), there may be some bias where people could
not  be reached for this reason. The main results are robust to not weighting observations.
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rom training to receive it. This implies ˆˇ  would be biased upwards relative to the impact of training were it to be provided
o the entire population.
Our survey of sector vets and interviews with leading NGO distributors provides some insights into the validity of these
oncerns. In multiple interviews, including with the two largest NGO donors, Heifer International and Send a Cow, as well as
ith sector vets, it was repeatedly conﬁrmed that whenever training is provided by NGOs, they often consider the training
n integral part of the process. Hence beneﬁciaries are typically trained in groups, where the whole group receives cows over
 period of time and they are encouraged to form a cooperative to be trained and learn together. Furthermore, none of the
nstitutions interviewed identiﬁed attendance at training as a problem, which is unsurprising given that these institutions
ften follow up directly with their beneﬁciaries for monitoring and evaluation purposes. This implies that no selection into
raining takes place on the side of the receiver. This information was  conﬁrmed by sector vets who  all but one reported that
rganizations train all of their beneﬁciaries and it is never the case that farmers approach the organizations for training.
This all suggests that beneﬁciaries are not self-selecting to receive training. However, it raises the question whether
rganizations that provide training with the cow select their beneﬁciaries based on certain parameters, rendering them
ifferent to the average beneﬁciaries in terms of ex ante observables. As discussed in Section 2 above, this however seems
nlikely. The reason for this is the important role that the local community plays in the beneﬁciary selection process: at the
ime this is done it is typically not known whether training will be provided with the cow, or the exact form that training
ould take if provided. Prior to the selection criteria being formalized in 2009, there may  have been less stringent application
f the criteria, but even so, all selection still had to pass through community channels. The discussion of beneﬁciaries
haracteristics above from Table 1 furthermore supports that beneﬁciaries which received training are not systematically
etter or worse off than those that did not.
. Results
For households to successfully engage in livestock rearing, they need to: (i) maintain an animal’s health; (ii) enable it
o become pregnant, produce offspring and lactate; (iii) to engage in best practices to maximize milk production; (iv) store
ilk in a sanitary manner; (v) bring excess produce (that is not for own consumption) to market. Different types of training
ocus on these different pathways: training on diseases will protect the animal’s health, and improved health will lead to a
igher likelihood of reproduction, which contributes to sustaining and increasing the herd size and at the same time allows
or milk production. Improved feeding practices would further be expected to lead to better quality and higher quantity of
ilk produced. Our training indicator, presented in Table 1, encompasses training on all these aspects. We  would therefore
xpect that if the returns to training are positive, then its provision should impact the sequence of outcomes we now study
rom milk production, to earnings, through to asset accumulation. We  analyze different aspects of the training in Section
.6.
.1. Milk production
The ﬁrst outcome we consider is whether the simultaneous provision of training with the cow transfer correlates to
hether a household currently produces milk in 2012. Milk production is a precondition to reach the program’s long-term
oal of reducing poverty by improving nutrition and income. Table 2 provides probit estimates of Eq. (1) where the outcome
ariable, yics, is a dummy  variable equal to one if the household produces milk on survey date, and zero otherwise. Milk
roduction is recorded from all animals the household owns. The data does not allow us to distinguish whether the produced
ilk is speciﬁcally from the original Girinka cow. However we  note that 82% of beneﬁciaries report retaining the Girinka
ow: given the median household received their Girinka cow in 2009, there is some likelihood the other Girinka cows have
ither died or been sold. On average, each household owns 1.16 cows, with 74% of households owning one female cow, and
% owning no cow. Hence in the majority of cases it appears as if households own  exactly one cow and this is the originally
ransferred Girinka cow.
In Columns 1–6 of Table 2 we sequentially add-in more classes of control variables, and report marginal effects from
he probit model estimation of Eq. (1), evaluated at means of all controls. The stability of the estimate of interest ˆˇ across
hese speciﬁcations is therefore informative of whether this estimate is likely to suffer from omitted variable bias from
nobservables correlated to the variables we are able to control for. As can be seen across Columns 1–6, the sign, magnitude
nd signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcient on our training indicator is extremely robust across the different speciﬁcations when
ifferent sets of observables are controlled for. Column 1 simply regresses the dummy  for milk production on the training
ndicator dummy, unconditional on all other covariates. Girinka cow beneﬁciary households that received some training
imultaneous to the asset transfer of the cow are 15pp more likely to be producing milk on the survey date. Columns 2–6
how this ﬁnding to be robust to the inclusion of sector dummies, characteristics of the cow received, household head
haracteristics, household controls, and controls related to the sector vet characteristics. In Column 6 once all these controls
re added, the marginal impact of training remains signiﬁcant at the 1% level and the magnitude, 14pp, is not signiﬁcantly
ifferent from the marginal impact estimated in the unconditional speciﬁcation in Column 1 of 15pp.
To benchmark this magnitude we note that 25% of households did not receive training produce currently milk. Hence
he increase of 14pp in Column 6 corresponds to a 56% increase in the likelihood of producing milk for those households
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Table 2
The provision of training and current milk production.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unconditional Sector dummies Animal controls HH head controls HH controls Sector Vet controls
Training received with Girinka cow [yes=1] 0.150*** 0.165*** 0.141*** 0.146*** 0.134*** 0.140***
(0.046) (0.054) (0.053) (0.052) (0.051) (0.052)
Household (HH) head has some primary educ. [yes=1] −0.018 −0.022 −0.015
(0.046) (0.045) (0.046)
HH  head has some secondary educ. [yes=1] −0.083 −0.060 −0.062
(0.089) (0.092) (0.092)
No  of assets owned before Girinka cow received −0.010 −0.010
(0.009) (0.009)
HH  lives in a single structure [yes=1] −0.023 −0.021
(0.056) (0.057)
Roof  made of tiles [yes=1] 0.056 0.053
(0.063) (0.063)
Floor  made of earth/dung [yes=1] 0.017 0.020
(0.057) (0.057)
Sector  dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Animal controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
HH  head controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
HH  controls No No No No Yes Yes
Sector  Vet controls No No No No No Yes
Observations (clusters) 786 (59) 786 (59) 786 (59) 786 (59) 786 (59) 786 (59)
Mean  for untrained HHs 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.250
Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is a dummy  variable equal to one if the household currently produces milk, and zero otherwise. All columns report probit estimates, where marginal effects are
reported  in each case. Standard errors are in parentheses that allow for clustering by cell. Survey weights are used throughout. All columns control for the indicator of whether training is received with the Girinka
cow.  Column 2 includes a complete series of sector dummies. Column 3 includes for characteristics of the Girinka cow received (breed, year cow was  received, indicator whether it was  a pass-on, whether it was
bundled  with medicines or other inputs), information on the household head (age, gender, education level dummies for primary and secondary schooling, a dummy variable for whether the main occupation of
the  household head is in farming), household characteristics (number of household members, a series of controls for the demographic composition of the household, the type of dwelling, type of roof and ﬂoor),
information received from sector vets proxying for accessibility (number of minutes to reach the cell, whether the vet reaches the cell by walking there, an interaction of the two, and the number of days passed
since  the sector vet visited the cell).
*Signiﬁcance at the 10% level. **Signiﬁcance at the 5% level. ***Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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hat received training. In short, around 39% of households with training produce milk. To get a sense of what the maximum
ttainable levels of milk production might be, in the most favorable circumstances a high potential cow should calve once
very 12 months and the subsequent length of milk production thereafter is 210 days for Ankole cows, 265 for crossbred and
00 for purebred cows (Argent et al., 2012). This implies that under ideal circumstances found on modern intensive dairy
arms, given the genetic structure of this herd, in any given survey cross section, 67% of cows should be producing milk. The
eneﬁciaries of Girinka cows remain a long way from this ideal, but the provision of training goes a considerable way  to
arrow these production gaps.
Moreover, the other coefﬁcients in Table 2 show that training is a far more robust predictor of milk production than
ther measures of human capital or wealth: all else equal, the education level of the household head has no impact on
he likelihood of producing milk, and the various proxies of household wealth (assets owned prior to the Girinka transfer,
hether the household’s dwelling is a single structure, whether the roof is made of tiles, and whether the ﬂoor is made of
arth/dung), do not correlate to whether the household produces milk once other covariates are conditioned on.
.2. Uses of produced milk
The next set of results in Table 3 focus on the quantity of milk produced, and the uses of this milk: whether it is con-
umed, given away, or sold. For completeness, Column 1a replicates our preferred speciﬁcation from Column 6 of Table 2
n whether the household produces milk. Column 1b estimates the amount of milk currently produced (in liters) using a
obit speciﬁcation (setting households that do not produce milk to zero). This shows, in line with the increased likelihood of
roducing milk, that households that receive training also signiﬁcantly increase the quantity of milk produced. On average,
 household that received training produces 1.5 l of milk more per day than Girinka beneﬁciaries that received no training
ith their cow transfer. This compares to an average daily production of slightly less than one liter per day for households
hat did not receive training. All else equal, the provision of training therefore increases the quantity of milk produced by
62% on average.9
Such an increase in milk production can of course be a result of two  different channels: an increase in the herd size and/or
n increase in the productivity of a given animal holding constant herd size. We  later present evidence on herd size when
e consider the impact of training on asset accumulation more broadly. On productivity per animal, the result in Column
c of Table 3 shows the previously documented increase in milk production is to a large extent driven by an increase in the
roductivity of cows, holding constant herd size. On average, each female cow owned by a household that received training
roduces 1.15 l more than for a household that received no training. As with the likelihood to produce milk, other measures
f the human capital of the household head and proxies for household wealth are not much correlated with the quantity of
ilk produced once all other factors are controlled for.
The remaining Columns of Table 3 explore what uses household put produced milk to. More speciﬁcally, we examine
hether (and if so by how much) the training impacts household behavior in terms of their milk consumption and/or their
ecision to give away or sell the home produced milk. Columns 2a and 2b analyze milk consumption, Columns 3a and 3b
xamine milk given away, Columns 4a and 4b examine milk sold to friends and neighbors, and Columns 5a and 5b analyze
ilk sold through local markets.
We see the provision of training signiﬁcantly increases the likelihood that households consume their own milk, as well as
eporting that they sell some of their produced milk to friends and neighbors. The marginal impact on the likelihood of milk
eing used for own consumption is nearly three times that on sales of milk to others in the village. This is as expected given
he low levels of milk consumption among beneﬁciary households. However, on the intensive margin we  do not ﬁnd any
mpact of training on the quantities of milk consumed (Column 2b). In contrast there is a signiﬁcant increase in the amount
f milk sold to friends and neighbors. Households that received training are 5.4pp more likely to sell milk to their peers
nd they sell on average 1.24 l more to them.10 Taken together these ﬁndings suggest that there is a relative shift towards
elling or giving away milk as production increases. Hence the proportion of own-produced milk that is consumed, falls as
roduction increases, even though total consumption increases.
For the other types of milk use (giving away milk or selling it through local markets), there are no impacts on either the
xtensive margin of the frequency with which such milk-transfers take place, nor on the intensive margin of the quantity
f milk that goes through such channels. On why beneﬁciaries with training appear to sell more to peers than to others, it
ight be that given the remoteness of these households, access to markets remains poor and the ﬁxed cost of traveling to
hem remain too high, especially given milk is perishable. We also note that the data suggests neighbors pay the highest
9 These levels of milk production from cows are lower than those reported in Anagol et al. (2012) based on survey data for cows in rural India in 2007:
hey  report daily milk production of between two and three liters per cow for most stages of the lactation cycle. Pimkina et al., (2013) evaluate the impact
f  the cows distributed by Heifer as part of the Girinka program, ﬁnding substantial impacts of cow transfers on dairy and meat consumption. There is
 longstanding literature examining the impacts of livestock ownership through the availability of animal source foods, that are an important source of
utrients in such rural economies, and through the mitigation of seasonal ﬂuctuations in food crop availability (Murphy and Allen, 2003).
10 A typical household in the sample consumes on average 1.1 l of milk per day of their home produced milk, which (based on the average household size
f  5.35) translates into approximately 75 l per person per year. While this puts our sample far below the recommended consumption ﬁgures of the World
ealth  Organization and Food and Agriculture Organization, which lie at 200 and 90 l of milk per person per year respectively, it is at the same time much
bove  the Sub-Saharan Africa average per capita milk consumption of 10.5 l in 2010–2012 (OECD, 2013).
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Table 3
The provision of training and uses of milk production.
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b)
Milk produced Produced milk
consumed
Produced milk given
away
Produced milk sold
(friends/neighb.)
Produced milk sold
(local market)
Yes/no Amount Amount per cow Yes/no Amount Yes/no Amount Yes/no Amount Yes/no Amount
Probit Tobit Tobit Probit Tobit Probit Tobit Probit Tobit Probit Tobit
Training received with Girinka cow [yes=1] 0.140*** 1.506** 1.145** 0.158*** 0.376 0.019 0.491 0.054* 1.236* 0.033 1.472
(0.052) (0.669) (0.513) (0.051) (0.315) (0.029) (0.416) (0.030) (0.641) (0.024) (1.011)
Household (HH) head has some primary educ. [yes=1] −0.015 −0.257 −0.391 −0.042 −0.023 0.027 0.394 0.011 0.256 0.008 0.520
(0.046) (0.557) (0.540) (0.054) (0.310) (0.038) (0.563) (0.022) −0.562 (0.019) (1.044)
HH  head has some secondary educ. [yes=1] −0.062 −0.593 −0.745 −0.112 0.094 0.173** 2.112*** −0.038* −1.100 −0.025 −1.268
(0.092) (1.198) (0.943) (0.114) (0.593) (0.081) (0.734) (0.022) (0.933) (0.021) (1.808)
No  of assets before Girinka cow received −0.010 −0.126 −0.077 −0.003 −0.017 −0.001 −0.037 0.006 0.182** −0.009** −0.501**
(0.009) (0.125) (0.094) (0.009) (0.058) (0.004) (0.063) (0.004) (0.089) (0.004) (0.225)
HH  lives in a single structure [yes=1] −0.021 −0.046 −0.347 −0.048 −0.161 0.012 0.117 −0.041 −1.044 0.011 0.578
(0.057) (0.851) (0.638) (0.074) (0.492) (0.044) (0.687) (0.044) (0.838) (0.018) (1.301)
Roof  made of tiles [yes=1] 0.053 0.447 0.257 0.032 0.122 0.023 0.279 0.049 0.997 −0.037** −2.27**
(0.064) (0.832) (0.705) (0.062) (0.324) (0.030) (0.462) (0.038) (0.872) (0.018) (1.125)
Floor  made of earth/dung [yes=1] 0.020 −0.344 −0.175 0.058 −0.015 0.041 0.677 0.054*** 1.929*** −0.098* −3.569***
(0.057) (0.757) (0.584) (0.076) (0.388) (0.027) (0.508) (0.017) (0.744) (0.050) (1.187)
Sector  dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HH  Head Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HH  controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector  Vet controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Animal  controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations (clusters) 786 (59) 786 (59) 738 (59) 786 (59) 738 (59) 578+ (44) 578+ (44) 624+ (47) 624+ (47) 612+ (44) 612+ (44)
Mean  for untrained HHs 0.250 0.909 0.704 0.437 1.124 0.123 0.176 0.098 0.235 0.082 0.300
Notes: The dependent variable across columns changes. Speciﬁcations related to whether any milk is produced, consumed, given away, sold to friends/neighbors or sold to local markets (Columns 1a, 2a, 3a,
4a,  5a) are estimated by probit models, where marginal impacts are reported. Speciﬁcations related to the quantities of milk produced, consumed, given away, sold to friends/neighbors or sold to local markets
(Columns  1b, 1c, 2b, 3b, 4b, 5b) are estimated by tobit models. The smaller sample size in some columns is then is due to some households consuming all the milk they produce. Standard errors are in parentheses
that  allow for clustering by cell. Survey weights are used throughout. All columns control for the following covariates in addition to the indicator of whether training is received with the Girinka cow: a complete
series  of sector dummies, characteristics of the Girinka cow received (breed, year cow was  received, indicator whether it was a pass-on, whether it was bundled with medicines or other inputs), information on the
household head (age, gender, education level dummies for primary and secondary schooling, a dummy  variable for whether the main occupation of the household head is in farming), household characteristics
(number  of household members, a series of controls for the demographic composition of the household, the type of dwelling, type of roof and ﬂoor), information received from sector vets proxying for accessibility
(number  of minutes to reach the cell, whether the vet reaches the cell by walking there, an interaction of the two, and the number of days passed since the sector vet visited the cell). + The drop in sample size is
due  to households that consume all the milk they produce.
*Signiﬁcance at the 10% level. **Signiﬁcance at the 5% level. ***Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
p
n
4
t
t
d
c
s
w
t
o
t
h
r
c
(
e
c
i
a
T
p
I
e
t
i
s
c
W
p
w
t
y
i
h
o
T
f
t
c
t
p
T
fJ. Argent et al. / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 108 (2014) 19–39 31
rice for the milk: this might be because watering down milk - and hence reducing its quality – is more easily monitored by
eighbors.
.3. Earnings
Given the evidence suggests households sell more milk as a result of having received training with their Girinka cow
ransfer, the next natural outcome to consider is household earnings from milk sales. Table 4 presents these results where
he dependent variables relate to current daily milk production and its value (Columns 1a and 1b), earnings from current
aily milk production (Columns 2a and 2b), and earnings from milk production in the last month (Columns 3a and 3b). To
alculate the value of daily production produced by household i, Vmilk
i
, we need to price milk that is self-consumed. To do
o, we multiply the number of liters currently produced per day times the relevant price of milk, so that,
Vmilki =
{
ps−i ∗ Qmci ifQmsi = 0
pi ∗ Qmsi + min[pi; ps−i] ∗ Qmci otherwise
(2)
here Qms
i
is the quantity of milk sold (in liters) by household i, Qmc
i
is the quantity of milk consumed by household i, pi is
he price received by household i for the liters of milk they actually sell, and ps−i is the median price in a cell received by
ther households that sell milk. In our sample, the median price of a liter of milk varies around RWF100 to RWF200.
Unsurprisingly given the earlier ﬁndings on milk production and milk usage, we ﬁnd that training signiﬁcantly increases
he value of the home produced milk by on average RWF  514 per day (Column 1b). This translates into an increase of daily
ousehold income by US.82 cent, equivalent to almost 66% of a non-trained household’s daily income. In line with the earlier
esults on animal productivity, we also conﬁrm that most of the earnings increase occurs through increased earnings per
ow per day from milk production: these rise by RWF  422 (not shown).
Column 2a shows that beneﬁciaries with training are 9pp more likely to currently have earnings from actual milk sales
as is consistent with the evidence from Table 3 on the uses of non-consumed milk); Column 2b shows the corresponding
arnings increase is on average RWF  340. This result is not only highly signiﬁcant statistically, but also economically signiﬁ-
ant: it is a sixfold increase in earnings as compared to the average earnings of households that did not receive training. The
ncrease is lower when we consider the reported earnings in the last month (Columns 3a and 3b), but trained households
re still estimated to have earned three times as much within the last month than those households that were not trained.
aken together, these ﬁndings on earnings show that even if market linkages remain weak, the monetary returns to training
rovision remains high through sales to other households within the same village.11
It is possible that households that received training substitute labor or capital away from other activities towards dairying.
f this was the case, we would ﬁnd the effects on total household earnings to be smaller than the effect on dairy activities. Our
vidence suggests however that this is not the case. Once the top 2% of total income observations are trimmed, households
hat received training have signiﬁcantly more sources of income (Column 4a) and the impact on total household earnings
n the month preceding the survey is quantitatively almost identical to the one on earnings from milk production over the
ame period (Column 4b).
To gauge the rate of return to the training provided, we compare this daily monetary return of RWF  514, to the per beneﬁ-
iary cost of training provision (but ignoring any additional costs households incur in producing the additional revenues).12
e  obtained information on training costs from one of the most important NGO partners for the delivery of the Girinka
rogram, Send a Cow. Their animal husbandry related training, that takes place over seven days and in groups of farmers,
as estimated to cost around RWF  7,800 per beneﬁciary. Hence a comparison of costs and beneﬁts suggests the provision of
raining would break even if the daily earnings gains documented above of RWF  514 were maintained for only 15 days of the
ear. As a point of comparison, we note that in ideal circumstances, after calving, cows typically produce milk for approx-
mately 10 months. In our setting, even after taking into account all the differences from ideal circumstances for animal
usbandry, the provision of training is likely to deliver higher milk yields for a number of months, yielding an effective rate
f return far higher than 100% for those farmers for whom the training does lead to a higher likelihood of milk production.
here are unlikely to be many other types of investment available to beneﬁciary that yield such returns in the same time
rame.13This calculation is valid for those households that produce more milk as a result of the training. The earlier results showed
hat the provision of training leads to around 14% more households producing milk in the ﬁrst place. Factoring this into the
alculation, the ex ante expected increase in the value of milk production is 0.14 × 514 = RWF  72, and so the entire program
11 Given that the demand for milk is relatively constant over the year, it is also likely that the provision of training helps to reduce the volatility of earnings
o  households, not just raise the mean level of earnings. Such mechanisms are explored in more detail in Bandiera et al. (2013).
12 While we do not have detailed information on the additional costs households might incur in obtaining the additional return, we note that on trans-
ortation costs for milk only a few households report positive out-of-pocket costs (for the majority the cost likely represent the opportunity costs of time).
he  same applies to the costs of transporting feed.
13 It would be reasonable to suppose there are additional ﬁxed costs associated with training provision, or costs associated with ﬁrst registering farmers
or  such training. However, the basic point remains: the returns to training with the Girinka cow yields large returns.
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Table 4
The provision of training and earnings from milk production.
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b)
Milk produced Value total daily
milk
Earnings from daily
milk production
Earnings from milk
production last month
Number of
income sources
Total HH earnings
in last month
Yes/no Production Yes/no Amount Yes/no Amount
Probit  Tobit Probit Tobit Probit Tobit
Training received with Girinka Cow [yes=1] 0.140*** 514.3** 0.093*** 339.6*** 0.064* 6026* 0.166** 6060**
(0.052) (218.3) (0.035) (128.0) (0.037) (3551) (0.069) (2513)
Household (HH) head has some primary educ. [yes=1] −0.015 −102.8 −0.025 −111.1 0.017 649.5 0.017 524.4
(0.046) (179.1) (0.031) (130.6) (0.032) (3887) (0.058) (2175)
HH  head has some secondary educ. [yes=1] −0.062 −342.1 −0.076*** −481.6** −0.062** −5592 0.270 13,476*
(0.092) (367.8) (0.020) (234.9) (0.031) (6976) (0.176) (7141)
No  of assets owned before Girinka cow received −0.010 −35.64 −0.002 −8.892 −0.001 19.83 0.025* 950.5*
(0.009) (38.20) (0.004) (20.10) (0.006) (701.4) (0.014) (554.8)
HH  lives in a single structure [yes=1] −0.021 −95.33 −0.018 −57.71 −0.041 −4912 −0.103 −9160
(0.057) (230.8) (0.042) (156.8) (0.038) (3984) (0.168) (6589)
Roof  made of tiles [yes=1] 0.053 169.9 0.039 128.4 −0.007 −132.5 0.169 5525*
(0.063) (223.4) (0.028) (113.4) (0.039) (4510) (0.110) (3306)
Floor  made of earth/dung [yes=1] 0.020 −116.7 −0.033 −156.1 −0.027 −4418 −0.154 −11,667**
(0.057) (218.3) (0.033) (121.8) (0.037) (3930) (0.099) (4804)
Sector  dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HH  head controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HH  controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector  Vet controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Animal  controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations (clusters) 786 (59) 786 (59) 685+ (50) 685+ (50) 647++ (49) 647++ (49) 786 (59) 768
Mean  for untrained HHs 0.250 241.1 0.109 56.36 0.125 2100 1.178 19863.1
Notes: The dependent variable across columns changes. Speciﬁcations related to whether any milk is produced, whether any earnings are generated from daily milk production, and whether any earnings are
generated  from milk production in the last month (Columns 1a, 2a, 3a) are estimated by probit models, where marginal impacts are reported. Speciﬁcations related to the value of total daily milk production,
earnings  from daily milk production and earnings from milk production in the last month (Columns 1b, 2b, 3b) are estimated by tobit models. The smaller sample sizes in some columns is due to some households
not  selling any of their milk. Standard errors are in parentheses that allow for clustering by cell. Survey weights are used throughout. All columns control for the following covariates in addition to the indicator of
whether  training is received with the Girinka cow: a complete series of sector dummies, characteristics of the Girinka cow received (breed, year cow was received, indicator whether it was a pass-on, whether it
was  bundled with medicines or other inputs), information on the household head (age, gender, education level dummies for primary and secondary schooling, a dummy variable for whether the main occupation
of  the household head is in farming), household characteristics (number of household members, a series of controls for the demographic composition of the household, the type of dwelling, type of roof and
ﬂoor),  information received from sector vets proxying for accessibility (number of minutes to reach the cell, whether the vet reaches the cell by walking there, an interaction of the two, and the number of days
passed  since the sector vet visited the cell). + The drop in sample size is due to households that do not sell any of their milk. ++ The additional drop in sample size in the per animal regressions is due to missing
information on the number of animals the farm owns. Variable presented in column (4b) is trimmed >98th percentile.
*Signiﬁcance at the 10% level. **Signiﬁcance at the 5% level. ***Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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Table  5
The provision of training and herd size and asset accumulation.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Herd size Cows born Cows purchased Cows sold Cows died Assets
Training received with Girinka cow [yes=1] 0.065 0.136* −0.011 0.096*** 0.011 0.269**
(0.066) (0.075) (0.044) (0.035) (0.021) (0.118)
Household (HH) head has some primary educ. [yes=1] 0.019 −0.002 0.084** 0.031 0.023 0.280**
(0.060) (0.071) (0.034) (0.043) (0.024) (0.123)
HH  head has some secondary educ. [yes=1] −0.097 −0.229 0.119 −0.075 0.020 0.867***
(0.114) (0.250) (0.080) (0.079) (0.047) (0.209)
No  of assets before Girinka cow received −0.001 0.004 −0.002 0.006 0.003 −0.058
(0.011) (0.015) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.042)
HH  lives in a single structure [yes=1] 0.007 −0.085 0.048 −0.098 0.004 −0.437*
(0.157) (0.119) (0.054) (0.073) (0.038) (0.236)
Roof  made of tiles [yes=1] 0.090 0.028 0.013 −0.020 −0.009 0.299
(0.076) (0.086) (0.050) (0.033) (0.030) (0.194)
Floor  made of earth/dung [yes=1] −0.106 −0.303** −0.099 −0.095** −0.047 −1.180***
(0.094) (0.116) (0.075) (0.047) (0.037) (0.212)
Sector  dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HH  head controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HH  controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector  Vet controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Animal controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations (clusters) 785 (59) 785 (59) 785 (59) 785 (59) 785 (59) 786 (59)
Mean  for untrained HHs 1.338 0.898 0.160 0.154 0.065 3.217
Notes: The dependent variable across columns changes. All speciﬁcations are estimated using OLS regression models. Standard errors are in parentheses
that  allow for clustering by cell. Survey weights are used throughout. All columns control for the following covariates in addition to the indicator of whether
training is received with the Girinka cow: a complete series of sector dummies, characteristics of the Girinka cow received (breed, year cow was  received,
indicator whether it was  a pass-on, whether it was bundled with medicines or other inputs), information on the household head (age, gender, education
level  dummies for primary and secondary schooling, a dummy variable for whether the main occupation of the household head is in farming), household
characteristics (number of household members, a series of controls for the demographic composition of the household, the type of dwelling, type of roof
and  ﬂoor), information received from sector vets proxying for accessibility (number of minutes to reach the cell, whether the vet reaches the cell by walking
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shere,  an interaction of the two, and the number of days passed since the sector vet visited the cell).
Signiﬁcance at the 10% level. **Signiﬁcance at the 5% level. ***Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
ould break even if farmers maintained the higher milk yields documented above for 108 days. Again this is likely given
he usual 10 month period over which cows normally supply milk.
.4. Herd size and asset accumulation
As discussed above, the observed increase in household’s milk production can be driven by higher productivity of indi-
idual cows, or by an increase in the number of cows producing milk. We  earlier documented the impact of training on
he productivity per cow, and now turn to analyze the impact of training on overall herd size. Training can impact different
hannels leading to stable, or increased, herd sizes. For example knowledge on when and how to inseminate an animal can
ncrease the success rate of breeding and calving, which in turn leads not only to an increase in herd size without having
o purchase animals, but also to milk production. Training on diseases on the other hand prevents animals from dying and
ence helps maintain constant herd sizes, all else equal.
We look at the impact of training on the herd size in Column 1 of Table 5. While the coefﬁcient is positive, it is not
igniﬁcantly different from zero. More interestingly though, from the remaining columns we learn that while the herd size
emains stable, households that were trained have signiﬁcantly more calves born to their farm (Column 2), and they sell
igniﬁcantly higher numbers of cattle (Column 4). It hence becomes clear that training not only increases productivity of
nimals but also helps the households to breed more animals. Calving of course increases milk production directly, but also
llows the household to sell animals.
Column 6 begins to examine how households uses these various sources of additional income from increased milk sales
nd sales of young calves: speciﬁcally we can check whether households that received more training with their original
irinka cow are able to accumulate more assets today (recall that as shown in Table 1, households with and without training
eport similar assets prior to the Girinka transfer). No information was collected on savings, although we  note that an
stablished earlier literature has suggested that livestock is often the most important savings device or store of value for
he rural poor, as alternative forms of informal or formal savings devices rare (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993). Households
ere asked about what types and how many tools and assets they own, for thirteen different items. The households were
lso asked to report how many of these assets were purchased after receiving the Girinka cow. In Column 6 of Table 5 we
resent results for the total number of asset types owned by the household. In Appendix Table A1 we present more detailed
nformation by each asset type on whether it is owned and the number owned for a subset of asset types (cellphone, bicycle,
tove, and mattress).
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Fig. 2. Impacts of training on milk production by year the Girinka cow was  received. Notes: The predicted probabilities of series of interactions between
the  year of transfer and the training indicator are plotted. Standard errors are in parentheses that allow for clustering by cell. Survey weights are used
throughout. The estimation controls for the following covariates in addition to the interaction terms: a complete series of sector dummies, characteristics
of  the Girinka cow received (breed, year cow was  received, indicator whether it was  a pass-on, whether it was  bundled with medicines or other inputs),
information on the household head (age, gender, education level dummies for primary and secondary schooling, a dummy variable for whether the main
occupation of the household head is in farming), household characteristics (number of household members, a series of controls for the demographic
composition of the household, the type of dwelling, type of roof and ﬂoor), information received from sector vets proxying for accessibility (number of
minutes to reach the cell, whether the vet reaches the cell by walking there, an interaction of the two, and the number of days passed since the sector vet
visited  the cell). +++ denotes signiﬁcance at 1%, ++ at 5%, and + at 10% level.
We  ﬁnd that households that received training own  signiﬁcantly more types of assets (on average 0.27) and also own
a signiﬁcantly larger number of assets (0.67 more). Of the thirteen items the households were asked about, they own on
average 3.2 at the time the Girinka cow was provided to them. A coefﬁcient of 0.27 on the training indicator hence implies
an eight percent increase in types of assets owned if compared to non-trained households. The number of assets owned
increased by about 14%. Both results are highly signiﬁcant. In Table A1 we  ﬁnd that this result is predominantly driven
by an increase in stove ownership (Columns 4a and 4b). The mean of stove ownership for non-trained households is 27%.
Households with training are 13pp more likely to own  a stove. We  also ﬁnd that training impacts the likelihood of owning
a bicycle positively (Column 3a) and households that are trained seem to invest in a greater number of mattresses (Column
5b).
4.5. Impacts by year of transfer
Our sample covers Girinka beneﬁciaries that received cows since 2006. We now explore how the main outcomes vary by
year of transfer of the Girinka cow. The sample median year of receipt is 2009, three years before our survey. Around 30%
of households received their cow in or before 2008, 20% in 2009, 25% in 2010 and 20% in 2011 or later. To the extent that
similar recipients are targeted over time, this variation allows us to better understand how the complementarities between
training and cow transfers are shaped over time. In many cases we expect training to lead to self-perpetuating gains over
time to households in terms of milk production and calves sold. We  focus on the main outcomes investigated in Section 4:
whether the household produces milk, the amount of milk produced, earnings from daily milk production, and the number
of cows sold. To understand how impacts differs by year of the transfer, we  extend our baseline speciﬁcation in Eq. (1) by
allowing for a series of interactions between the year of transfer and the training indicator.
Fig. 2 plots these interactions for the outcome for whether any milk is produced. We  see that, except for beneﬁciaries who
received the Girinka cow in 2007, training provided with the cow increases the probability of currently producing milk for
each year of transfer. The difference between trained and untrained households is signiﬁcant for cows provided in 2008 and
2010.14 Reassuringly, we see the predicted probability of producing milk dropping sharply for all households who  received
the cow in 2011 (trained and untrained). Given that milk production is conditional on the cow giving birth, which would
usually not happen so quickly after the cow is received, this is an expected ﬁnding. Fig. 3 shows a very similar pattern is
found when considering the impact of training received with the cow on the quantity of milk currently produced. Again,
differences between trained and untrained households differs for training received in 2008 and in 2010 are signiﬁcantly
different from zero at conventional levels.
Fig. 4 shows the heterogeneous impacts of training by year of Girinka cow transfer for current earnings from selling
milk. We  again ﬁnd that the longer ago the training was received, the higher the impacts are on earnings from selling milk.
14 Note that to test for the statistical signiﬁcance of the interaction effect between trained and untrained beneﬁciaries, we estimated cross-partial deriva-
tives  of the interaction effects. This is necessary when dealing with interaction terms in nonlinear models (Norten et al., 2004), that is a probit speciﬁcation
in  this case and Tobit speciﬁcations in the remaining outcomes we  discuss.
J. Argent et al. / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 108 (2014) 19–39 35
0
1
2
3
4
P
re
di
ct
io
n-
A
m
ou
nt
 o
f m
ilk
 c
ur
re
nt
ly
 p
ro
du
ce
d
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Training==1Training==0
Year cow was received
Predictive Margins of interactions (year cow received X training)
Fig. 3. Impacts of training on amount of milk produced by year the Girinka cow was received. Notes: Results are obtained using a tobit speciﬁcation. For
further  notes see legend to Fig. 2.
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sig. 4. Impacts of training on current income from milk selling by year the Girinka cow was  received. Notes: Results are obtained using a tobit speciﬁcation.
or  further notes see legend to Fig. 2.
owever, while marginal impacts for trained beneﬁciaries are always above those of untrained ones, the difference is only
igniﬁcant when the cow was received one or two  years previous to the survey (in 2010 the difference is signiﬁcant at the 1%
igniﬁcance level, in 2009 at the 10% level). Finally, we consider the number of cows sold since the Girinka cow was received.
e ﬁnd the impacts of training are notably higher the longer ago the cow and training were received: cows received more
ecently simply have not had the time to produce offspring that could have been sold. More importantly, this ﬁnding is
onsiderably sharper for trained households, the left had side of Fig. 5 shows, with the differences among cows received in
006 and 2007 being signiﬁcantly different from zero.
These results are informative for the future evaluation of training bundled with livestock asset transfer programs: the
eturns to training vary over time and can be long lasting. We  have documented positive returns to training up to six years
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ig. 5. Impacts of training on number of cows sold since the Girinka cow was received by year it was  received. Notes: Results are obtained using a tobit
peciﬁcation. For further notes see legend to Fig. 2.
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after the initial asset transfer. For some of the most important means through with asset transfer programs increase incomes
– such as sales of calves – such outcomes necessarily take time to be realized and so will not be picked up in very short run
evaluations.
4.6. Training types
The analysis has so far exploited the fact that different distributors of cows offered varying levels of training, support
and extension services to recipients of cows. Some distributors provided cows with no complementary training, and others
hired their own veterinarians/trainers to extend services to their new beneﬁciaries. We now focus on two other elements of
the Girinka program and compare these features to the provision of training. First we note that some distributors also gave
some form of support package along with the cow, including for example medicines, or the materials for building a shed to
house the animal. Hence our next set of results show the impact of receiving such packages, that take the form of easing
capital constraints on the margin, rather than skills constraints, controlling for the receipt of training. This helps address
the concern that our previous results are merely picking up the receipt of this package rather than anything to do with the
returns to training.
Second, we note that one of the justiﬁcations for NGO distributors not providing training was that some perceived
government veterinarians to be easily accessible to farmers in case of need. Our survey instrument collected information on
whether individuals had received any training from sector vets. Hence our next set of results now additionally control for
such training having been received. When sector vets offer training, they often do so to groups of individuals in a village. In
our survey of sector vets, the majority of them reported that either everybody in a village (reported by 55% of vets) or every
farmer in a village (reported by 35% of vets) is invited to attend a training. Only 7% of vets stated that they select participants
based on need and only 11% said they decide to help a household or give them advice when they are visiting them for other
reasons.
As expected, there is strong evidence for households themselves demanding the type of group training session from vets
described above. All but one of the 30 sector vets stated that farmers approached them requesting training and the type of
training provided by the sector vets is very closely in line with the type of training demanded by the farmers. This raises
the concern that the indicator for having received training from the sector vet is endogenous and likely biased upwards as
better or more needy farmers may  have demanded such services in the ﬁrst place.
The results are in Table 6. As in the previous section we  focus again on on the main outcomes, now also including the
number of assets owned. We  note that across most outcomes, in these speciﬁcations where we also control for training from
Table 6
Types of training.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Milkd produced Earnings from daily
milk production
Cows sold Assets
Yes/no Amount
Probit Tobit Tobit OLS OLS
Training received with Girinka cow [yes=1] 0.139** 1.374* 330.2** 0.056 0.588**
(0.062) (0.766) (135.6) (0.042) (0.231)
Training receive later from Sector Vet [yes=1] 0.003 0.293 20.96 0.085* 0.165
(0.045) (0.546) (142.8) (0.048) (0.323)
HH  received other inputs with Girinka −0.032 0.550 91.76 0.039 −0.286
Cow  (feed, loan, medicines) [yes=1] (0.055) (0.848) (141.6) (0.061) (0.326)
Sector  dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HH  head controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HH  controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector  Vet controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Animal controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations (clusters) 786 (59) 786 (59) 786 (59) 786 (59) 786 (59)
Mean  for untrained HHs 0.250 0.909 0.109 0.154 3.217
Notes: The dependent variable across columns changes. The speciﬁcation related to whether any milk is produced (Column 1a) is estimated by a probit
model, where marginal impacts are reported. Speciﬁcations related to the amount or value of total daily milk production (Columns 2 and 3) are estimated by
tobit  models. The speciﬁcations related to the number of cows sold or assets owned (Columns 4 and 5) are estimated using OLS regression models. Standard
errors  are in parentheses that allow for clustering by cell. Survey weights are used throughout. All columns control for the following covariates in addition
to  the indicator of whether training is received with the Girinka cow: an dummy  variable for whether any training is received from a sector vet after the
Girinka  cow transfer, a complete series of sector dummies, characteristics of the Girinka cow received (breed, year cow was received, indicator whether
it  was a pass-on, whether it was bundled with medicines or other inputs), information on the household head (age, gender, education level dummies for
primary and secondary schooling, a dummy  variable for whether the main occupation of the household head is in farming), household characteristics
(number of household members, a series of controls for the demographic composition of the household, the type of dwelling, type of roof and ﬂoor),
information received from sector vets proxying for accessibility (number of minutes to reach the cell, whether the vet reaches the cell by walking there,
an  interaction of the two, and the number of days passed since the sector vet visited the cell).
*Signiﬁcance at the 10% level. **Signiﬁcance at the 5% level. ***Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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ector vets, the indicator for training received with the Girinka cow remains positive, signiﬁcant and of similar magnitude
o the earlier results. Two additional robust ﬁndings emerge.
First, the provision of training from sector vets has little signiﬁcant impact on these outcomes of interest. Even if such
raining is sought out endogenously, it appears to be not much correlated with later milk production, earnings and asset
ccumulation. This might tentatively suggest that the returns to training are especially high when provided at the same time
s livestock asset transfers, but that training provided subsequently has far lower returns. This in turn might be because
uch training is only sought, and only provided with some delay, when outcomes are deteriorating with regards to livestock
roduction. An alternative explanation for the low returns to training received from sector vets is that the quality of training
hat sector vets are able to provide is just much lower than that provided with Girinka cows. Indeed, 72% of sector vets
nterviewed indicated that it was in their job description to provide “advice” rather than training, suggesting that the nature
f sector vet training may  have been less formal. Sector vets also identiﬁed their training on a particular topic to be composed
n average of fewer sessions (1 as compared to 2), and of shorter length (3.1 h as opposed to 4.9 h) relative to NGO offered
raining.
Second, the results in Table 6 also show the provision of packages of medicines and other inputs at the same time as
sset transfers has little signiﬁcant impact on the outcomes of interest, indeed a number of the coefﬁcients have negative
oint estimates. This suggests that easing capital constraints slightly at the same time as livestock asset transfers is far less
ffective than such transfers being bundled with the provision of training.15
Both these results are informative for the design of future livestock asset transfer programs: training should be provided,
here should not necessarily be a reliance on existing public sector vets as a source of training to farmers, and the provision
f other inputs such as medicines, appears less effective in this setting than the provision of training per se.
. Conclusions
The Girinka One Cow policy is an ambitious and extensive asset transfer program, with over 130,000 livestock distributed
o the rural poor in since 2006. The program provides a ﬁrst opportunity to study the impacts of combining training with
ivestock asset transfers, relative to only providing livestock assets. We  are able to do so because we note that the Girinka
rogram was jointly implemented by government agencies and NGOs. The role of NGOs lay predominantly in the the
istribution of cows. Given NGOs varied in their capacity to provide training alongside cows, we  observe some beneﬁciary
ouseholds only receiving cow transfers and others receiving cows with complementary training. As farmers themselves
o not self-select to receive training, but rather the provision of training is driven by supply/capacity constraints faced by
GOs, the assignment of training is plausibly exogenous to other factors that drive outcomes related to milk production,
ivestock productivity, household earnings and assets, as measured up to six years after the initial livestock asset transfer.
Our results show that even in a setting where linkages between farmers and markets remain weak – that might attenuate
he returns to training all else equal say because farmers are unable to sell at high prices to urban consumers, the provision
f training with asset transfers still has permanent and economically signiﬁcant impacts on household’s milk production,
ivestock productivity, earnings, and asset accumulation. This training is found to be far more effective for these outcomes
f interest than the availability of subsequent training from local government vets, or the provisions of small amounts
f capital inputs provided with livestock asset transfers. The rate of return to the provision of training is high and likely
arger than for other investments available to beneﬁciary households: even a conservative estimate suggests training costs
ould be recovered and the program break even if the training allows households to obtain higher milk yields for three
dditional months of the year. As a point of comparison we note that in ideal circumstances, cows usually produce milk
or 10 months after calving. Moving forward, the ﬁndings suggest the crucial complementarity between asset transfers and
raining provision, the impacts of which persist over time, and for many outcomes, the impacts are self-perpetuating and
ncrease in magnitude over time.
We view the next step in the research agenda to be the implementation of an RCT to identify the impact of training with
ivestock asset transfers, either in the context of an ‘ultra-poor’ program, or a livestock transfer program more broadly. We
hus view our ﬁndings as providing novel, suggestive evidence on the way forward for research into the optimal design of
uch ultra-poor style livestock asset transfer programs. Our ﬁndings provide a timely input into the design of ultra-poor
rograms, as these have received much attention among policy makers as being a new model by which to alleviate poverty
mong the rural poor: such programs are indeed being trialed in many countries around the world, and the original program
perated by the NGO BRAC in Bangladesh is due to reach almost one million of the poorest households among the rural poor
y 2016. Moreover, our results are also informative for the growing number of livestock donation programs, that are seen
s key way to transfer resources to rural households in the developing world. For example, Heifer International, a leading
GO involved in animal donations, operates in over 128 countries, including Rwanda, and has donated millions of animals
uring its lifetime.
Our results suggest that capital in the form of livestock and skills are complementary. The skills training takes place
n a few days and covers topics such as how to build sheds for cows, what to feed cows, and trainings on disease and
15 We have also explored in ﬁner detail how these main impacts vary by the type of training received: we  ﬁnd that some impacts are driven by training
n  shed building, although all types of training are signiﬁcant for at least one outcome considered.
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manure. This type of training is not expensive, certainly not compared to the kinds of intense training currently provided by
many ultra-poor programs that can last between 12 and 24 months. Yet our results document that even such rudimentary
forms of training generate large and long lasting positive beneﬁts across a wide variety of outcomes of interest. Our ﬁnding
on the complementarity between livestock assets and training builds on other recent work, in a variety of spheres of the
development literature, suggesting the availability of capital might not be sufﬁcient to change occupational choices among
the poor in the absence of complementary training, and training might not be sufﬁcient without capital.16
We  also document the impacts of the complementarity of asset transfers and training over the longer term, up to six years
after the receipt of the Girinka cow for some households, effectively extending the time period that current evaluations of
ultra-poor programs have been able to cover. We also provide more detailed evidence on the mechanisms through which
such programs likely generate earnings gains to households, such as the propensity to produce milk, milk yield per animal,
and herd sizes. As such our ﬁndings suggest that future work – informed certainly by randomized control trials – should
investigate the optimal design of training to bundle with asset transfers. This will become increasingly important as such
programs are rolled out to different populations that vary in their links to markets, pre-existing levels of knowledge of
livestock rearing, and availability of alternative sources of training such as government and private sector vets.
Appendix A.
See Table A1.
Table A1
The provision of training and types of asset accumulation.
(1) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b)
No of assets
owned
Owns cellphone Owns bicycle Owns stove Owns mattress
Yes/no Number Yes/no Number Yes/no Number Yes/no Number
Tobit Probit Tobit Probit Tobit Probit Tobit Probit Tobit
Training received with Girinka cow [yes=1] 0.269** −0.032 0.171 0.054* 0.180 0.128*** 0.322*** 0.021 0.192**
(0.118) (0.049) (0.111) (0.028) (0.118) (0.043) (0.100) (0.053) (0.088)
HH  head has some primary educ. [yes=1] 0.280** 0.209*** 0.367*** −0.001 −0.009 0.012 0.049 0.109** 0.208**
(0.123) (0.053) (0.135) (0.031) (0.120) (0.048) (0.094) (0.048) (0.101)
HH  head has some secondary educ. [yes=1] 0.867*** 0.502*** 0.877*** 0.222*** 0.228 −0.056 −0.012 0.276*** 0.545***
(0.209) (0.035) (0.217) (0.086) (0.167) (0.080) (0.160) (0.055) (0.172)
No  of assets before Girinka cow received −0.058 0.075*** −0.003 0.026*** 0.011 0.050*** −0.031 0.112*** −0.018
(0.042) (0.012) (0.030) (0.005) (0.016) (0.011) (0.027) (0.011) (0.020)
HH  lives in a single structure [yes=1] −0.437* −0.029 −0.435** −0.120* −0.294* −0.146* −0.183 −0.170* −0.370**
(0.236) (0.085) (0.216) (0.062) (0.157) (0.076) (0.143) (0.087) (0.153)
Roof  made of tiles [yes=1] 0.299 0.167** 0.342** 0.039 0.370** 0.166** 0.068 0.003 0.047
(0.194) (0.078) (0.166) (0.041) (0.180) (0.067) (0.149) (0.063) (0.144)
Floor  made of earth/dung [yes=1] −1.180*** −0.354*** −0.705*** −0.012 −0.092 −0.060 −0.432** −0.225*** −0.410***
(0.212) (0.080) (0.170) (0.039) (0.107) (0.095) (0.179) (0.084) (0.149)
Sector  dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HH  head controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HH  controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector  Vet controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Animal controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations (clusters) 786 (59) 786 (59) 786 (59) 700 (53) 700 (53) 760 (58) 760 (58) 786 (59) 786 (59)
Mean  for untrained HHs 3.217 0.473 0.607 0.170 0.169 0.277 0.308 0.498 0.835
Notes: The dependent variable across columns changes. Speciﬁcations related to the number of assets of a given type is owned are estimated using a tobit
model  (Columns 1, 2b, 3b, 4b, 5b). Speciﬁcations related to whether an asset is owned are estimated by probit models, where marginal effects are reported
(Columns 2a, 3a, 4a, 5a). Standard errors are in parentheses that allow for clustering by cell. Survey weights are used throughout. All columns control for
the  following covariates in addition to the indicator of whether training is received with the Girinka cow: an dummy  variable for whether any training
is  received from a sector vet after the Girinka cow transfer, a complete series of sector dummies, characteristics of the Girinka cow received (breed, year
cow  was  received, indicator whether it was a pass-on, whether it was  bundled with medicines or other inputs), information on the household head (age,
gender, education level dummies for primary and secondary schooling, a dummy variable for whether the main occupation of the household head is in
farming), household characteristics (number of household members, a series of controls for the demographic composition of the household, the type of
dwelling, type of roof and ﬂoor), information received from sector vets proxying for accessibility (number of minutes to reach the cell, whether the vet
reaches  the cell by walking there, an interaction of the two, and the number of days passed since the sector vet visited the cell).
*Signiﬁcance at the 10% level. **Signiﬁcance at the 5% level. ***Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
16 Recent evaluations of business training programs for aspiring entrepreneurs with and without capital grants (de Mel  et al., 2008) provide evidence of
such  complementarity. This is also consistent with the fact that some evaluations of microﬁnance suggest it does not help create new businesses (Banerjee
et  al., 2010, Crépon et al., 2011, Karlan and Zinman, 2011; Kaboski and Townsend, 2011, 2012) and with the disappointing performance of short-term
training for existing micro-entrepreneurs, which have generally been found ineffective at increasing proﬁts and business growth (Field et al., 2010; Drexler
et  al., 2010; Karlan and Valdivia, 2011; Fairlie et al., 2012; Bruhn et al., 2012; McKenzie and Woodruff, 2012).
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